December 16, 1773, was deep into the rear-view mirror. A new year had begun, and February 1774 lay close to the horizon. Yet, for the British Parliament, the events of what later became known as the Boston Tea Party were still very much breaking news. Word had just reached London of what had happened in Boston. Now, how would the Crown and those in parliamentary power react to this shocking news?

Most contemporary sources of the period, as well as a litany of works in the historiography of the subject, contend that Britian’s reaction to what happened in December 1773, and thus their course in handling the situation in 1774, was done so prematurely and without much rational debate and discussion. Historian Jon Ferling suggests, “the myth arose that its government, under Prime Minister Frederick, Lord North, had acted in haste.” The myth had grown during the numerous setbacks the British later suffered during the war itself. And, in the wake of their ultimate defeat, many contemporaries across the pond argued that Britain’s leaders, “had failed to comprehend the gravity of the challenge,” i.e., using the military might of their nation to quell the rebellious colonies in 1774.

If one was to examine the proceedings of Parliament during this period 250 years ago, however, they would not find hasty decisions being made based on emotional reactions to the news out of Boston the previous month. This is especially so when the use of the country’s military resources was debated as an option to deal with the rowdy and disobedient Bostonians. Nothing could be farther for the truth contends Ferling, noting that the use of their military to enforce Crown law in the colonies began in the opening days of 1774, even before the throwing of the tea reached London. Not only was this thought discussed and debated in Parliament, but the reactions the colonists would have was also heavily considered. Some openly debated that such a strong application of Britain’s military in Boston, the Massachusetts Colony, and other coercive actions, may indeed spark yet another war in North America. These arguments were then quickly followed by questions of whether Britian could win in another conflict on this continent so soon after the French and Indian War; a conflict that had drained Britain’s finances and depleted her military ranks.  

As January 1774 concluded 250 years ago, and February was just days away, these larger questions on how Parliament and the Crown should react to the Boston Tea Party and course-correct those in colonies in open rebellion against Britain were continually debated. It was not until March 1774 that a decision was made. North, and thus Parliament, opted to avoid the potential for outright war by utilizing their military might first. Instead, they chose a route of punitive measures, the Coercive Acts (also known as the Intolerable Acts). As part of this legislation, certain parts would solely focus on Massachusetts as punishment for the events of December 16, 1773, in Boston. These acts also included closing Boston Harbor until the destroyed tea’s worth had been repaid, and Gen. Thomas Gage, commander of the British Army in America, installed as the colonial governor of Massachusetts. Gage contended that these refractory Bostonians would “be lions while we are lambs; but if we take the resolute part, they will prove very meek, I promise you.”

In the end, however, this course of action was not made in haste at all, but rather after nearly four full months after the throwing of the tea in Boston harbor. And, one could argue that North and Parliament initially sought to refrain from the sole use of  Britain’s military might, rather opting for legislative settlement to the issues that arose from Massachusetts. But, as history played out 250 years ago in 1774, as historian Ferling contends, “Britain, of course, miscalculated hugely.”