On August 15, Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates began to finalize his plans to move against Camden, SC. Gates, appointed as the new commander of the Southern Department the previous month, believed the British garrison in Camden was weak. Gates was receiving intelligence gathered by partisan commander Thomas Sumter who was acting in and around Camden. He informed Gates that the American army outnumbered the British post and that a large portion of the men at Camden were taken ill and not fit for duty (on this account, Sumter was correct). Sumter did not provide the intelligence that Lord Cornwallis was now in Camden with reinforcements and was taking personal command of the British force in Camden.

With this information, Gates felt confident in his ability to take on the British in Camden. He developed a plan that involved a three-part movement. He would leave his force south to Saunder’s Creek (about six miles north of Camden) and establish a strong defensive position. He also ordered Francis Marion and his men to the southeast. Gates wanted Marion to take command of the Williamsburg militia, watch the British movements, and destroy boats in the Santee River that a defeated Cornwallis might need to retreat from Camden to Charleston. The third prong he ordered a few days earlier on August 13. Gates, under the encouragement of Thomas Sumter, decided to send 100 Maryland Continentals and 300 Carolina militiamen (as well as two brass three pounders) to join Sumter and move down the western side of the Wateree. From this location Sumter could attack supplies and reinforcements going into Camden from Ninety Six to the west. Gates’s confidence was evident.

As Gates made his final disposition to move south, Sumter’s militia along with his Continental detachment met some success west of Camden. The Wateree River flowed south just one mile west of Camden. Near the important Wateree Ferry that served the major route west from Camden, Loyalist Lt. Col. James Cary built a small fort on his farm near the ferry. Sumter was aware of the fort and decided to see if he could capture it. When Col. Thomas Taylor of Sumter’s command launched the attack, most of the defenders inside were asleep, and the others were deceived by Patriot militia dressed just like those occupying the fort. The Loyalists immediately surrendered. Sumter reported that his men killed 7 and captured 30 prisoners, including Cary. Also included in the loot were 38 wagons of supplies and nearly 300 head of cattle. After capturing Cary’s Fort, Sumter was also able to attack and capture a relief column from Ninety Six to Camden. Sumter’s spoils from this attack numbered nearly 70 prisoners and numerous wagons. Sumter also reaffirmed his earlier intelligence to Gates by writing that the British in Camden “do not exceed two thousand, and not as many as one thousand of the militia, who aregenerally sickly, and much dispirited.” Sumter’s intelligence, though not accurate, gave Gates encouragement on the upcoming movement toward Camden. At 10pm on August 15, Gates had his army on the road south towards Camden.

Gates was flush with optimism, at that same time Cornwallis had his army on the road north. Though the British forces were about half the size of Gates, they were more than Gates expected and consisted of some of the best men in the British army led by one of their most accomplished generals. Soon, due to a twist of fate, these two armies collided along the Great Wagon Road in the long life pine forest of South Carolina. The result was one of the worst days in the history of the United States Army.

Authors Rob Orrison and Mark Wilcox’s new book “All That Can Be Expected: The Battle of Camden and the British High Tide in the South, August 16, 1780” is due out August, 2023 and available at: https://www.savasbeatie.com/