Join us this Sunday at 7pm as we ERW authors and historians Dan Welch and Mark Maloy continue their 250th anniversary coverage of the New York Campaign. They’ll chat with us about the events following the Continentals retreat from Long Island, Nathan Hale, the Turtle, the Peace Conference, and of course the fighting at Kip’s Bay and Harlem Heights. Welch and Maloy’s new book, “Conquer or Die” will be available this fall. This Revelry will be LIVE on our Facebook and You Tube pages at 7pm.
The New York Campaign had been building for over year by August 1776. In July 1775, previous British commander of forces in America, Thomas Gage, had sent a request to his superiors to be allowed to leave Boston and begin a new campaign in New York. Following Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, Gage’s force remained bottled up and besieged in and around Boston and Charleston. When word of approval of Gage’s plan reached Boston, so too did orders relieving him of command. Before he departed for England in October 1775, he met with his successor, William Howe, and greatly stressed the importance of moving the theater of war to New York. Howe would follow Gage’s preplanning and approval to the letter, including waiting until the spring to began the shift in the army’s base of operations. Howe’s timetable, however, was moved up after the arrival of Henry Knox’s artillery train and the placement of guns on Dorchester Heights. On March 17, 1776, Howe and 11,000 troops and Loyalist citizens sailed for Nova Scotia. Foreshadowing the British departure and the location of the next campaign in a letter written two days before they set sail, Col. Joseph Reed, later George Washington’s adjutant-general, correctly asserted, “If Howe should leave Boston, we expect he will make for New York; and, at all events, we look upon that as one of the scenes of the summer business.”
Meanwhile, George Washington also looked to New York as the next seat of this growing conflict. In January he sent Charles Lee to begin laying out a position for the Continental Army to take once it shifted southward from Boston. Not long after Lee arrived in February 1776 he assured the Committee of Safety that even though he could see no way to make New York into a “tenable fortification” he could make a position strong enough to be “a most advantageous field of battle” that would “cost the enemy many thousands of men to get possession of it.” Just two months later, on April 13, Washington and the Continental Army arrived.
The Continental Army commander had no other choice than to do what he could in New York. There was immense political pressure on Washington not to abandon it, the Congress believing it had high political and psychological value. Many in Congress believed abandoning it would demoralize the Patriot cause and swell the morale of the Loyalist population in the city and colony thereof. Furthermore, it was a central location along the Atlantic coast and a conduit of communication and supplies between New England and the southern colonies via the Hudson River. Furthermore, the Hudson River/Lake Champlain corridor remained a vital passage to Canada and the Great Lakes. New York was also a bustling economic hub, the second largest urban center in the colonies, with a port, shipbuilding, and deep-water harbor had immense naval and trade value. Widely considered as the “key to the continent,” Washington would have a difficult task defend the city, it’s deep water port, and the numerous navigable waterways; all reasons the British wanted to seize the city in their effort cutoff New England from the middle and southern colonies. Writing to his brother, John Augustine Washington, between May 31 and June 4, 1776, he confessed, “We expect a very bloody Summer of it at New York . . . & I am sorry to say that we are not, either in Men, or Arms, prepared for it.”
Finally, after several months of resupplying and refitting his army in Nova Scotia, William Howe and his command arrived on Staten Island, unopposed, in June 1776. Pvt. Daniel McCurtin, 1st Company of Maryland Rifles, recorded the British arrival, noting he saw, “the whole Bay was full of shipping as ever it could be. I declare that I thought all London was afloat.”Over the coming weeks he would be joined by his brother, Richard, with large numbers of reinforcements, ships, transports, supplies, and Hessians. Although the two brothers leaned into their role of peace commissioners, attempting to end this growing rebellion through pardons and not bloodshed in July, by August, with no peaceful resolution insight, military preparations moved forward.
On August 20, 1776, British troops began loading onto ships and transports from their Staten Island camps, and 250 years ago today, August 22, 1776, the first British troops landed on Long Island at Denyse’s Ferry. Howe had chosen this site for its richness and crops and plentiful livestock in which to supply his army. Still unsure of Howe’s intentions, and constantly worried about his flank and rear being turned by the British Navy, Washington had spread his army dangerously thin across several islands with waterways separating reinforcements should the need for them arise. Thus, on August 22, Washington only had 3,000 men, John Nixon and Nathaniel Heard’s brigades, and some Long Island militia in which to contest the landing. All they could really do was raise the alarm. By the end of the day 20,000 British troops were on Long Island. Only time would tell, at least for Washington, whether or not this would be Howe’s main push or simply a diversion to another beachhead and main strike.
Learn more about the 1776 New York Campaign with ERW’s forthcoming release, Conquer or Die: The 1776 New York Campaign, by Dan Welch and Mark Maloy. Pre-order here!
Join us this Sunday at 7pm as we welcome author and historian Michael C. Hardy. Hardy, best known for his many Civil War and North Carolina history published works, he’ll chat with us about the American Revolution in southern Appalachia and the raw and uncertain conflicts that occurred there between Patriots, Loyalists, and Indians. Hardy’s new book “Western North Carolina and Eastern Tennessee in the American Revolution” is now available and worth a read. There are few that know North Carolina history and can tell a story quite as good as Mike can. This Revelry is pre-recorded and will post to our Facebook and You Tube pages at 7pm.
The First Blow for Liberty. Battle of Lexington, April 1775. Copy of print by A. H. Ritchie after F.O.C. Darley (Library of Congress)
There is a sense in the American military tradition that the Republic has relied on citizen-soldiers in times of crisis to bolster its army rather than maintain a large standing force. While the modern American military, post-1945, has increased in size and power to accommodate the global commitments incurred in the wake of World War II, for the bulk of American history, the United States sought to make do with a small professional force, bolstered with militias called to arms and volunteers when war threatened. While this arrangement for national defense was in part driven by fiscal concerns, as a large standing army incurs a cost to the treasury, another aspect concerned how the United States perceived itself. The early Republic, and before its establishment, the thirteen original colonies, inherited from England a distrust of standing armies and a faith in community militias. Historian John Galvin’s The Minutemen posits that the colonial militia, especially in New England, had a long tradition of active training participation, evolving organization, and combat experience prior to the commencement of hostilities on 19 April 1775, and that it was the progenitor of the American citizen-soldier who won the American Revolution.[1] In contrast, James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender argue in A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789 that commitment to militia duty was honored largely in the breach in the American colonies prior to the revolution, that the militia performed unevenly during the War for Independence, and that ultimately the Continental Army achieved the victory that cemented America’s freedom.[2] Martin and Lender conclude that the American tradition of a sturdy yeoman militiaman is more legend than fact and used to justify maintaining a small regular army during the early days of the republic.
The notion of the American militiaman responding to an alarm to defend his own appears repeatedly in the literature on the Revolutionary War. John Shy, in his 1962 paper on colonial military systems, described the notion underlying the efficacy of the militia system as “only when free men must themselves fight to maintain their liberty are they likely to remain free.”[3] According to Fred Anderson Berg in his encyclopedia of Continental Army forces, the militia systems of the American colonies evolved from English tradition, and were geographically organized around townships and counties, and were designed to serve for short periods, without pay, and in proximity to their homes. The intent was for them to be an “in extremis” force designed to protect their own neighborhoods. Anderson’s entry on the militia in the American Revolution paints their performance in a favorable light and does nothing to contradict the idea that militia units contributed significantly to securing American Independence.[4] David Hackett Fischer reinforces these points in his analysis of the events of April 1775, providing a brief summary of the martial qualities of the men of Massachusetts Bay Colony, specifically noting that at least once a generation between 1689 and 1763, the militia answered the call to arms in operations against indigenous peoples or French colonial opponents, either separately or in combination.[5] Despite these descriptions of militia origins, motivations, or performance, none of the writers delved into what made militia troops effective, as John Galvin did in his book The Minutemen, The First Fight: Myths and Realities of the American Revolution. Galvin first appears as an unlikely proponent of the militia tradition. He spent his career as a professional soldier, having graduated from the United States Military Academy, served multiple tours in Vietnam, and ultimately retired as a General Officer as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe.[6] Upon closer examination, his motivation for doing so becomes apparent. Galvin was a native of Massachusetts and keenly interested in the military history of his home state. He grew up learning the myth that when the King’s troops departed Boston to collect military supplies stored in Concord, every day farmers left their homesteads, banded together against the invaders, and chased them back to whence they came. The take did not make sense to Galvin precisely because of his military training and combat experience. Such a performance in battle suggested organization, command & control, and logistical forethought rather than a spontaneous response to a threat.[7]
Galvin set out to learn the facts behind the myth and discovered that the Massachusetts troops that responded to the alarm of 19 April 1775 enjoyed substantial advantages. He learned, contrary to legend, that the colonists benefited from significant logistical and preparation and training, political support, and a highly organized administrative structure that turned the colony’s country structure into a regimental system capable of rapidly assembling combat power when required. Gavin found that this level of sophistication was the product of an evolving system of alarm companies and other community-based defensive systems dating back to the late 17th century, combined with a renewed emphasis on readiness dating from the fall of 1774, when Massachusetts Committees of Safety began preparing in earnest for what they felt was an inevitable clash with the British troops occupying the colony.[8] This combination of tradition, commitment, and anticipation resulted in a system that could be activated as required, with each participant trained and equipped for action, knowledgeable of their leadership, with an overarching command structure prepared to lead once the men took the field.[9]
Galvin paints a picture of a highly prepared and motivated militia force and documents how the Massachusetts colonists achieved this level of readiness. In contrast, James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Leander postulate that the militia tradition had to be modified to enable the Americans to field a long-service professional force capable of meeting the British Army in sustained combat.[10]
Surrender of Cornwallis. Painting by John Trumbull. (Library of Congress)
In A Respectable Army, The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789, Lender and Martin do not seek to contradict Galvin, but to show that the Massachusetts militia structure was not replicated throughout all thirteen colonies in the spring of 1775, nor were even the Massachusetts militia inclined to remain in the field for prolonged operations.[11] The authors make an effective case that the militia earned an uneven reputation throughout the war, with experienced officers such as Nathaniel Greene arguing that men “coming from home with all the tender feelings of domestic life were not sufficiently fortified with natural courage to withstand the shocking scenes of war.”[12] Greene’s point is that long service in the field, under discipline and consistent training, molded men into effective combat soldiers. Lender and Martin argue that this is precisely the hardening that the Continental Army provided. The authors point out that after the opening battles of the war, the militia’s performance against British regulars was uneven at best. Militia forces provided the bulk of Washington’s troops during the ill-fated battles around New York City in the summer and fall of 1776, in which the British and Hessian troops under Howe forced Washington to evacuate the city and retreat across New Jersey to Pennsylvania by the end of the year. Despite retrieving his fortunes with lightning strikes at Trenton and Princeton in December 1776 and January 1777, Washington’s fortunes were at a low ebb, and he sought to rebuild his Army into a more professional force capable of holding its own in the field. Lender and Martin document that he was able to do just that, relying more on long-service volunteers than short-service militia to achieve his ends. The reality of Continental Army service clashed with the myth of the virtuous citizen-soldier: Washington’s troops were not yeomen protecting home and hearth, but men on the margins of society hoping to improve their fortunes through military service. They were available to serve precisely because they did not have a large stake in the day-to-day running of their home communities.[13]
Galvin presents a contrasting argument to Martin and Lender regarding the militia’s contribution to victory in the American Revolution. While Galvin’s arguments are well-documented, his focus is narrowly oriented toward the Massachusetts colony and the events of April 1775. He does not extrapolate his conclusions to the militia’s overall contribution throughout the war, whereas Martin and Lender demonstrate that militia quality was uneven, combat performance was lacking, and that the military leaders of the United States sought to create a more professional force to achieve military success.
Bibliography
Berg, Fred Anderson. Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units: Battalions, Regiments and Independent Corps. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1972.
Fischer, David Hackett. Paul Revere’s Ride. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Galvin, John R. The Minute Men: A Compact History of the Defenders of the American Colonies, 1645–1775. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967.
Martin, James Kirby, and Mark Edward Lender. A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1982.
Shy, John. A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
[1] John R. Galvin, The Minute Men: A Compact History of the Defenders of the American Colonies, 1645–1775 (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967), 59-67.
[2] James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789 (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1982), 45.
[3] John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 31.
[4] Fred Anderson Berg, Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units: Battalions, Regiments, and Independent Corps(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1972), 76-77.
[5] David Hackett Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 151.
Emerging Revolutionary War welcomes guest historian Drew Palmer. A biography follows at the end of this post.
What does it look like when veteran soldiers do not want to fight anymore? When morale plummets and the realities of war take their toll on men. This is exactly what happened to 150 men in the Maryland Line of the Continental Army in the late summer of 1780.
The 1st Maryland Regiment holds the line at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, March 15, 1781
The continental regiments of Maryland that made up what became known as the “Maryland Line” or “Old Line State” had earned the reputation as a reliable, brave, and disciplined fighting force as early as 1776 after their actions in the Battle of Long Island.1 At the Battle of Camden on August 16, 1780, the 1st and 2nd Maryland Brigades offered a stout defense as Gen. Charles Cornwallis’s British force crashed into Continental soldiers from Maryland and Delaware. In the end, though, Maj. General Horatio Gates’s Southern Continental Army was completely routed from the field, with many of the Maryland Continental troops taken prisoner and held in the small village of Camden after the battle.2
The village of Camden, South Carolina, was an unpleasant place to be after the battle. The crowded conditions and brutal summer climate of South Carolina began to produce sickness amongst Cornwallis’s men and the American prisoners that were held in Camden. To prevent further sickness from spreading, Cornwallis decided to split the American prisoners held at Camden into divisions of around 150 men. These divisions were guarded by small detachments of the British army and marched from Camden to Charlestown, South Carolina.3 One detachment of the British 63rd Regiment of Foot escorted 150 prisoners of the 1st Maryland Brigade captured at Camden. The division made it to Thomas Sumter’s abandoned plantation at Great Savannah, about 60 miles northwest of Charleston. As the Maryland prisoners and their British guards halted for the night, militia commander Francis Marion received word from a Loyalist deserter that the Marylanders were nearby and decided to ambush the British element in hopes of freeing the Maryland prisoners.4 In the early morning hours of August 25, 1780, Marion’s militia attacked.
Join us this Sunday, December 14th at 7pm as we return LIVE for this Rev War Revelry on the Canadian Campaign of 1775. We will discuss Arnold, Montgomery, Morgan and others on America’s attempt to capture Montreal, Quebec and create a “14th state.” From Arnold’s arduous march to Quebec through the wilds of Maine to Montgomery’s capture of Montreal, our historians Alex Cain and Mike Cecere will cover the entire campaign and answer the question “was the capture of Canada possible?”
This fall and winter mark the 250th anniversary of the campaign and the battles of Montreal and Quebec, and both of our speakers have taken part in the commemorative events. Grab a drink and watch live on our Facebook page, also add questions in the chat.
The Commission of Captain Samuel Nicholas, the first American Marine. (USMC)
Today marks the 250th birthday of the Marine Corps. November 10, 1775 was a milestone in the creation of American naval power, but the birthday story is a little more complicated.
The Continental Congress resolved to create a navy under its auspices on October 13, 1775, but much work remained to build American naval power to a point where it might serve a strategic purpose. Individual colonies had already begun creating naval forces and George Washington had leased ships under the army’s authority. Thus, the resolution served as more of milestone on a long road, rather than a fresh beginning.
On October 30, the Continental Congress considered the reports of its naval committee and confirmed recommendations for two vessels of 14 and 10 guns. Moreover, it resolved to add two more ships to its burgeoning navy, one of 20 guns and one carrying up to 36 guns. It also added four new members to the naval committee, bringing it to a total of seven. Stephen Hopkins (RI), Joseph Hewes (NC), Richard Henry Lee (VA), and John Adams (MA) joined John Langdon (NH), Silas Deane (CT), and Christopher Gadsden (SC).[1] On November 2, Congress gave the naval committee authority to call on the treasury for up to $100,000 to acquire a navy and delegated to the committee the authority to recruit officers and seamen, offering them prize money in the amount of one-half the value of all warships and one-third the value of transports made prizes.[2] It also took up a petition from a Committee of Safety in Passamaquoddy, Nova Scotia to join the association represented by the Continental Congress. Naturally, Congress appointed a committee—Silas Deane, John Jay, Stephen Hopkins, John Langdon, and John Adams to consider the matter. The naval expansion and Passamaquoddy petition sparked a new round of thinking about American naval power.
War Without Mercy: Liberty or Death in the American Revolution by Mark Edward Lender and the late James Kirby Martin is an enlightening and innovative look at violence and norms during the American Revolution. The authors waste no time getting to the point: they want to know why the war reached a point in which seemingly boundless levels of violence were embraced by all sides without regard to emerging standards of international law nominally intended to govern the use of force in warfare, collectively referred to as jus in bello, a Latin phrase essentially referring to the legal conduct of a war or justice in war. (Jus ad bellum refers to the legality of initiating a war. Collectively, they are key components of just war theory. Lender and Martin focus on jus in bello, particularly as it refers to legal or moral constraints on violence.)
War Without Mercy lays out the basic concepts of jus in bello as it was understood in the late 18thcentury. While historians often attribute the origins of modern international law to Hugo Grotius, Lender and Martin take Emer de Vattel’s landmark 1758 work “The Law of Nations” as the baseline text relevant to the American Revolution. Vattel offered limits on the conduct of military operations, clearly delineating concepts such as combatants, non-combatants, and proportionality. In general, he tried to narrow the scope of war so that it remained the domain of organized governments and outside the domain of broader society. Elites on both sides of the Atlantic had often read Vattel’s work, or were at least familiar with the ideas it contained, and War Without Mercy demonstrates that many of them sought to honor its principles, for moral, professional, and practical reasons.
That said, Lender and Martin argue that violence committed outside of the purview of elite-led revolutionary governments and the Continental Army (usually) characterized the war. The vast majority of fighting during the American Revolution occurred in small battles, skirmishes, and raids that resembled mob and gang violence directed at people out of uniform more than organized martial conduct. In that context, it routinely violated concepts of jus in bello. In addition to outlining earlier studies making that case, War Without Mercy examines the war in New Jersey, the western theater, the New York frontier, and the south. While those regions saw significant battles or campaigns, the day-to-day war was fought between small units of militia or irregulars with an occasional admixture of regulars or Continentals. In each case, Lender and Martin examine the escalation of events over the course of the war and the reasons each side tended toward “existential warfare,” essentially, war to the death in which the alternative to victory was total destruction. Given such high stakes, any constraints on means were self-defeating. No combatants could run the risk of losing the war by being charitable towards their enemies. Outrage sparked outrage. Thus, violence escalated like a ratchet as each side retaliated for perceived wrongs. It was a possibility several prominent patriots recognized before the fighting began. Indeed, James Lovell predicted it in his 1771 speech commemorating the Boston Massacre. War Without Mercy attributes the beginning of the cycle to the rebels, who quickly turned to intimidation, the threat of violence, and outright violence to silence loyalists and establish local political control as British colonial government collapsed.
One chapter examines Benedict Arnold’s raid on New London, CT. Lender and Martin consider the offensive and the Battle of Groton Heights, as the assault on Fort Griswold defending the River Thames was known, in the context of jus in bello. In general, despite the destruction of New London and the bloody results at Fort Griswold, they find the raid consistent with Vattel’s law of war. As a major privateering base, New London made itself a legitimate target of war and Arnold strove to limit damage to private property that did not contribute to the American war effort. The bloodletting at Fort Griswold was more the result of the fog of war, weak command and control, and the natural challenges of suddenly attempting to restrain men in the midst of intense combat. The New London raid, however, does demonstrate the blurring of lines between combatant and non-combatant, legitimate and non-legitimate objects of military operations, under the doctrine of jus in bello, as the war progressed and intensified. Lender and Martin liken it to the difficult decisions facing RAF Bomber Command during World War II, when it shifted from ineffective attempts to bomb specific targets to area bombing.
War Without Mercy is a must read. Revolutionary War library shelves are rife with biographies, battle studies, and political narratives. Fewer books place the American Revolution in the wider study of warfare and its evolution. By considering the war in the context of emerging principles of jus in bello and the rapid escalation to existential warfare, Lender and Martin are bringing a new analytical perspective to the study of the American Revolution. It’s a vital interpretation of the war’s nature.
Join us this Sunday at 7pm on our Facebook page as we welcome historian and author Gabe Neville back to Rev War Revelry. Gabe has just finished and published one of the most comprehensive Revolutionary War unit histories ever written. Focusing on the Eighth Virginia Regiment, Neville’s book titled “The Last Men Standing, The Eighth Virignia Regiment” is a must have for anyone’s library. We will talk with Gabe about his research, interesting tidbits of his book and what let him to this project.
This presentation witll be LIVE at 7pm on Sunday, August 24th. Tune in and share any thoughts or questions in the chat. Gabe is always a fun chat, so grab a drink and enjoy learning about his in depth research on the 8th Virginia Regiment.
On July 3, 1775 George Washington formally took command of the Continental Army in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Appointed Commander-in-Chief by the Second Continental Congress on June 15, 1775, Washington arrived in Cambridge on July 3, 1775 and assumed command of a disorganized and poorly supplied force besieging British troops in Boston. His leadership would begin the transformation of colonial militias into a unified fighting force capable of challenging British military power.
Washington’s assumption of command occurred at a time when the American colonies were transitioning from protest to open rebellion. The battles of Lexington and Concord in April 1775 had already ignited armed conflict, and the Battle of Bunker Hill in June had demonstrated that colonial forces could stand up to British regulars, though at great cost. Washington understood the gravity of his new role. In a letter to the President of Congress, he wrote humbly, “I am truly sensible of the high Honor done me in this Appointment… I do not think myself equal to the Command I am honored with.” This characteristic modesty was paired with a strong sense of duty and resolve.
Washington assumes command at Cambridge, Courtesy Library of Congress
On July 3, Washington appeared before his troops on Cambridge Common, dressed in a blue coat with buff facings, signifying his Virginian roots. There is no official transcript of a speech he may have delivered that day, but contemporary accounts describe a solemn and determined atmosphere. One observer, Reverend William Emerson, noted in his diary, “General Washington… is a tall and noble-looking man, commanding the respect of all who see him.”
Washington immediately set to work imposing discipline, organizing supply chains, and creating a chain of command. Though former commander of the army, Major General Artemus Ward, worked hard on instilling discipline, he was not a man that instilled a lot of confidence. Washington was appalled by the state of the army, writing in frustration to Congress: “The Army… is in a very improper condition to carry on a vigorous War.” He introduced regular drills, uniform codes, and standardized procedures, striving to turn the disparate bands of militiamen into a functioning army. As historian David McCullough noted, “It was Washington’s presence alone that gave the army cohesion.”
Despite his military inexperience—Washington never commanded an army of this size—he brought a unifying vision and moral authority. His appointment was also politically astute, bridging the regional divide between New England and the southern colonies. A Virginian leading New England troops sent a clear message of unity in the face of British oppression.
Marker commemorating Washington on the Cambridge Common, photo by William Griffith
The Cambridge encampment remained Washington’s headquarters until March 1776, when he successfully forced the British evacuation of Boston by fortifying Dorchester Heights with cannons brought from Fort Ticonderoga. This early strategic victory, achieved without major bloodshed, was a major morale boost and affirmed Congress’s faith in their commander.
In retrospect, July 3, 1775, was the beginning of an enduring legacy of leadership and a love of Washington by his men and officers. Through discipline, vision, and personal integrity, he began shaping a ragtag collection of volunteers into the Continental Army, laying the groundwork for American independence.
Emerging Revolutionary War Era 