Embattled Farmers or Continentals?

The First Blow for Liberty. Battle of Lexington, April 1775. Copy of print by A. H. Ritchie after F.O.C. Darley (Library of Congress)

There is a sense in the American military tradition that the Republic has relied on citizen-soldiers in times of crisis to bolster its army rather than maintain a large standing force. While the modern American military, post-1945, has increased in size and power to accommodate the global commitments incurred in the wake of World War II, for the bulk of American history, the United States sought to make do with a small professional force, bolstered with militias called to arms and volunteers when war threatened. While this arrangement for national defense was in part driven by fiscal concerns, as a large standing army incurs a cost to the treasury, another aspect concerned how the United States perceived itself. The early Republic, and before its establishment, the thirteen original colonies, inherited from England a distrust of standing armies and a faith in community militias. Historian John Galvin’s The Minutemen posits that the colonial militia, especially in New England, had a long tradition of active training participation, evolving organization, and combat experience prior to the commencement of hostilities on 19 April 1775, and that it was the progenitor of the American citizen-soldier who won the American Revolution.[1] In contrast, James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender argue in A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789 that commitment to militia duty was honored largely in the breach in the American colonies prior to the revolution, that the militia performed unevenly during the War for Independence, and that ultimately the Continental Army achieved the victory that cemented America’s freedom.[2] Martin and Lender conclude that the American tradition of a sturdy yeoman militiaman is more legend than fact and used to justify maintaining a small regular army during the early days of the republic.

    The notion of the American militiaman responding to an alarm to defend his own appears repeatedly in the literature on the Revolutionary War. John Shy, in his 1962 paper on colonial military systems, described the notion underlying the efficacy of the militia system as “only when free men must themselves fight to maintain their liberty are they likely to remain free.”[3] According to Fred Anderson Berg in his encyclopedia of Continental Army forces, the militia systems of the American colonies evolved from English tradition, and were geographically organized around townships and counties, and were designed to serve for short periods, without pay, and in proximity to their homes. The intent was for them to be an “in extremis” force designed to protect their own neighborhoods. Anderson’s entry on the militia in the American Revolution paints their performance in a favorable light and does nothing to contradict the idea that militia units contributed significantly to securing American Independence.[4] David Hackett Fischer reinforces these points in his analysis of the events of April 1775, providing a brief summary of the martial qualities of the men of Massachusetts Bay Colony, specifically noting that at least once a generation between 1689 and 1763, the militia answered the call to arms in operations against indigenous peoples or French colonial opponents, either separately or in combination.[5] Despite these descriptions of militia origins, motivations, or performance, none of the writers delved into what made militia troops effective, as John Galvin did in his book The Minutemen, The First Fight: Myths and Realities of the American Revolution.    Galvin first appears as an unlikely proponent of the militia tradition. He spent his career as a professional soldier, having graduated from the United States Military Academy, served multiple tours in Vietnam, and ultimately retired as a General Officer as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe.[6] Upon closer examination, his motivation for doing so becomes apparent. Galvin was a native of Massachusetts and keenly interested in the military history of his home state. He grew up learning the myth that when the King’s troops departed Boston to collect military supplies stored in Concord, every day farmers left their homesteads, banded together against the invaders, and chased them back to whence they came. The take did not make sense to Galvin precisely because of his military training and combat experience. Such a performance in battle suggested organization, command & control, and logistical forethought rather than a spontaneous response to a threat.[7]

     Galvin set out to learn the facts behind the myth and discovered that the Massachusetts troops that responded to the alarm of 19 April 1775 enjoyed substantial advantages. He learned, contrary to legend, that the colonists benefited from significant logistical and preparation and training, political support, and a highly organized administrative structure that turned the colony’s country structure into a regimental system capable of rapidly assembling combat power when required. Gavin found that this level of sophistication was the product of an evolving system of alarm companies and other community-based defensive systems dating back to the late 17th century, combined with a renewed emphasis on readiness dating from the fall of 1774, when Massachusetts Committees of Safety began preparing in earnest for what they felt was an inevitable clash with the British troops occupying the colony.[8] This combination of tradition, commitment, and anticipation resulted in a system that could be activated as required, with each participant trained and equipped for action, knowledgeable of their leadership, with an overarching command structure prepared to lead once the men took the field.[9]

     Galvin paints a picture of a highly prepared and motivated militia force and documents how the Massachusetts colonists achieved this level of readiness. In contrast, James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Leander postulate that the militia tradition had to be modified to enable the Americans to field a long-service professional force capable of meeting the British Army in sustained combat.[10]

Surrender of Cornwallis. Painting by John Trumbull. (Library of Congress)

  In A Respectable Army, The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789, Lender and Martin do not seek to contradict Galvin, but to show that the Massachusetts militia structure was not replicated throughout all thirteen colonies in the spring of 1775, nor were even the Massachusetts militia inclined to remain in the field for prolonged operations.[11] The authors make an effective case that the militia earned an uneven reputation throughout the war, with experienced officers such as Nathaniel Greene arguing that men “coming from home with all the tender feelings of domestic life were not sufficiently fortified with natural courage to withstand the shocking scenes of war.”[12] Greene’s point is that long service in the field, under discipline and consistent training, molded men into effective combat soldiers. Lender and Martin argue that this is precisely the hardening that the Continental Army provided. The authors point out that after the opening battles of the war, the militia’s performance against British regulars was uneven at best. Militia forces provided the bulk of Washington’s troops during the ill-fated battles around New York City in the summer and fall of 1776, in which the British and Hessian troops under Howe forced Washington to evacuate the city and retreat across New Jersey to Pennsylvania by the end of the year. Despite retrieving his fortunes with lightning strikes at Trenton and Princeton in December 1776 and January 1777, Washington’s fortunes were at a low ebb, and he sought to rebuild his Army into a more professional force capable of holding its own in the field. Lender and Martin document that he was able to do just that, relying more on long-service volunteers than short-service militia to achieve his ends. The reality of Continental Army service clashed with the myth of the virtuous citizen-soldier: Washington’s troops were not yeomen protecting home and hearth, but men on the margins of society hoping to improve their fortunes through military service. They were available to serve precisely because they did not have a large stake in the day-to-day running of their home communities.[13]

      Galvin presents a contrasting argument to Martin and Lender regarding the militia’s contribution to victory in the American Revolution. While Galvin’s arguments are well-documented, his focus is narrowly oriented toward the Massachusetts colony and the events of April 1775. He does not extrapolate his conclusions to the militia’s overall contribution throughout the war, whereas Martin and Lender demonstrate that militia quality was uneven, combat performance was lacking, and that the military leaders of the United States sought to create a more professional force to achieve military success.

Bibliography

Berg, Fred Anderson. Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units: Battalions,
     Regiments and Independent Corps
. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books,
     1972.

Fischer, David Hackett. Paul Revere’s Ride. New York: Oxford University
     Press, 1994.

Galvin, John R. The Minute Men: A Compact History of the Defenders of the
     American Colonies, 1645–1775
. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967.

Martin, James Kirby, and Mark Edward Lender. A Respectable Army: The
     Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789
. Arlington Heights, IL:
     Harlan Davidson, 1982.

Shy, John. A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military
     Struggle for American Independence.
New York: Oxford University
     Press, 1976.


[1] John R. Galvin, The Minute Men: A Compact History of the Defenders of the American Colonies, 1645–1775 (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967), 59-67.

[2] James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789 (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1982), 45.

[3] John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 31.

[4] Fred Anderson Berg, Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units: Battalions, Regiments, and Independent Corps(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1972), 76-77.

[5] David Hackett Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 151.

[6] Galvin, The Minute Men, vii.

[7] Galvin, The Minute Men, 3-5.

[8] Galvin, The Minute Men, 73.

[9] Galvin, The Minute Men, 206.

[10] Martin and Lender, A Respectable Army,

[11] Martin and Lender, A Respectable Army, 46.

[12] Martin and Lender, A Respectable Army, 45.

[13] Martin and Lender, A Respectable Army, 212.

“The people here are Liberty mad…” Nicholas Cresswell and the American Independence

Emerging Revolutionary War welcomes guest writer, historian Kenneth Bancroft


Leesburg, Virginia. Tuesday, July 9, 1776. “…News that the Sanhedrim (1) had declared the
thirteen united Colonies Free and Independent States. That this was intended by the
Northern Colonies from the first, I am well convinced…” (2) These are not the words one
expects when talking about the Declaration of Independence, but to a 26-year-old
entrepreneurial Englishman caught in a revolution that he neither wanted nor supported,
this was the worst news ever. (3)

The Journals of Nicholas Cresswell is an informative source on the Revolutionary War from what could be considered a ‘Tory’ point of view. It is a personal account that shows that the struggle for freedom was not just on the battlefield but also in the streets and homes at the end of the colonial era. Nicholas Cresswell was an outsider from the moment he stepped on American soil in 1774 and heard news of the siege of Boston, noting that the colonists “talk as if they were determined to dispute the matter with the Sword.” (4) For two years, Cresswell observed the American colonies descend into rebellion, “The people here are Liberty mad, nothing but war is thought of.” (5)


When the colonies officially separated, Cresswell felt despair and anger instead of hope.
Cresswell’s intention was to set up life as a farmer, but misfortune and bad timing foiled his
plans. He blamed the “cursed Rebellion” for turning this “earthly paradise to a Hell upon
terra firma.” (6) Constantly under the suspicion of the local committees tasked with enforcing the
Continental Association as a suspected ‘Tory’ spy, he grew to despise the Continental
Congress as vile and hypocritical. “The Congress under the fallacious pretense of nursing
the tender plant, liberty, which was said to thrive so well in American soil, have actually
torn it up by the very root.” (7)

Cresswell could not help himself and always got into political discussions in the bars and
houses of Virginia. “At Dinner had a long dispute with Doctor Jacson about the origin of the
present proceedings…Most of the company agrees that I had the better of the argument.
But never so much embarrassed in my whole life.” (8) He even chided General Washington as a yeoman farmer “Negro-driver” (9) and a and was befuddled that he kept evading General Howe. Ultimately, he did decide that he was a decent General.


In the end, Cresswell decided that Virginia, for all of its bounty, was lost and returning to
England was his only option. After three years of surviving the storm of a revolution, he
made his slip to British lines. While technically not a Loyalist, (10) Cresswell provides critical
details on the otherwise missing narrative of Loyalism in the colonies, especially Virginia.
His last act dramatically involved him in a plot to free English sailors and soldiers from a jail
in Alexandria Virginia. Some of the conspirators were well known merchants in
Alexandria. (11) Thankfully Cresswell’s account exists to inform how a revolution hits the
home front and the profundity of independence at that time.

To learn more about Nicholas Cresswell, visit Kenneth Bancroft’s website at: https://nicholascresswell.wordpress.com/ and see his Rev War Revelry episode on Nicholas Cresswell on our You Tube Channel at: https://youtu.be/fyONRWmy6_I?si=-tIAEmJ69-GHv2BI


1 Cresswell’s derisive term for the Continental Congress. It refers to the Sandedrim, or Jewish Supreme
Council. “Sanhedrim,”McClintock and Strong Biblical Cyclopedia, accessed June 2, 2026
https://www.biblicalcyclopedia.com/S/sanhedrim.html. 2 Nicholas Cresswell, The Journals of Nicholas Cresswell, 1774-1777, (North Charleston, South Carolina:
reprinted 2024, 117. Free online version at the Library of Congress https://tile.loc.gov/storageservices/service/gdc/lhbtn/30436/30436.pdf. 3 See: “An Englishman’s Journal of the Revolutionary War: The Journals of Nicholas Cresswell 1774-1777,”
Emerging Revolutionary War, October 20, 2025, https://emergingrevolutionarywar.org/2025/10/20/anenglishmans-journal-of-the-revolutionary-war-the-journals-of-nicholas-cresswell-1774-1777/. 4 Cresswell, 16. 5 Ibid, 77. 6 Ibid, 197.
7 Ibid, 198.
8 Ibid, 99.
9 Ibid, 193. It is interesting that that turn of phrase is famously used by Samuel Johnson, an avowed Tory who
despised what the American colonies were doing. See: Interview, “Gordon S. Wood: How the American
Revolution “infused into our culture our noblest ideals and highest aspirations,” Library of America, accessed
June 7, 2026 https://www.loa.org/news-and-views/639-gordon-s-wood-how-the-american-revolutioninfused-into-our-culture-our-noblest-ideals-and-highest-aspirations/. 10 McGill … Cresswell was more of an immigrant who still had cultural ties to his homeland. 11 William Buckner McGroarty, “Loyalism in Alexandria, Virginia, The Virginia Magazine of History and
Biuography, 52, no. 1 (January 1944), 42-43, accessed March 11, 2026 https://www.jstor.org/stable/4245269.

From Muster Roll to Lost Note: The Paper Trail of Edmund Fowler’s Revolutionary War Compensation

Emerging Revolutionary War welcomes guest historian Marc Lee.

At first glance, it is an unremarkable accounting ledger filled with columns of figures and financial calculations. Yet hidden among its entries is the story of a Revolutionary War soldier whose compensation claim continued to circulate through Connecticut’s bureaucracy years after the fighting had ended. The surviving manuscript, together with wartime muster rolls and treasury records, allows us to follow Edmund Fowler’s claim from military service to a replacement for a lost note, revealing how the Revolution’s paperwork could outlive the war itself.[i]

The document at the center of this story is an Invoice of Officers’ and Soldiers’ Notes, Payable June 1783, a manuscript created as Connecticut settled the financial obligations left by the Revolutionary War. Rather than recording the service of a single soldier, the ledger summarizes military notes issued to officers and enlisted men, listing an aggregate amount exceeding £10,700 and bearing a notation that the account was “charged July 9, 1784.” At first glance, it appears to be little more than a routine accounting record.[ii]

Figure 1. Invoice of Officers’ and Soldiers’ Notes, Payable June 1783, showing the original heading and later accounting calculations.

A closer examination tells a different story. The manuscript remained in active use long after it was first prepared. While the principal heading and endorsements were written in one hand, later calculations were added in a different ink and by a different hand, indicating that officials returned to the account years after the notes first became payable.[iii]

Those physical clues reveal an important reality about the Revolution’s aftermath. Paying veterans was not accomplished through a single transaction. Military service had to be verified, financial obligations reconciled, and documentary evidence maintained as claims moved through the state’s accounting system. What appears to be an ordinary ledger therefore preserves part of the administrative machinery that transformed wartime service into recognized financial compensation.

Among the many entries associated with Connecticut’s officers’ and soldiers’ notes is one that allows this broader process to be examined on a human scale. Through a series of surviving military and treasury records, the documentary trail of Revolutionary War veteran Edmund Fowler can be followed from his wartime muster rolls to the postwar administration of his compensation claim, offering a rare glimpse into how one soldier’s service continued to generate paperwork long after the fighting had ended.[iv]

The ledger identifies many officers and enlisted soldiers, but one name stands out because his surviving records extend well beyond this single document. Edmund Fowler appears in a series of Connecticut military records that preserve different stages of his wartime service, allowing his postwar compensation to be traced across several distinct record groups.[v]

Continue reading “From Muster Roll to Lost Note: The Paper Trail of Edmund Fowler’s Revolutionary War Compensation”

“In the Ranks of the Revolution: James Johnston’s War” Part II

Part I

Emerging Revolutionary War welcomes back guest historians Lori Amos Doss & Jarred Marlowe

Part 2: A Veteran in the Southern Campaign and the Road to Yorktown

In early 1781, after years of nearly continuous service, James Johnston finally set out for home on furlough. It must have been a long-awaited journey. Yet before he could reach his destination, events once again pulled him back into the war.

While passing through Prince Edward County, Virginia, Johnston learned of the difficult situation facing General Nathanael Greene in the South. British forces under Lord Cornwallis were pressing hard, and Greene’s army was in poor condition. Supplies were scarce, clothing was inadequate, and many of the soldiers were inexperienced militia. Previous defeats at Charleston and Camden had weakened the Continental presence in the region, leaving Greene with a force that struggled to match the discipline of British regulars.

Johnston understood the danger. Rather than continue home, he took action. Drawing on his experience in the northern campaigns, he recruited twelve veteran soldiers who had completed their terms of service. Together, they traveled south to join Greene. Their arrival was timely. Greene assigned them as adjutants to officers commanding Virginia militia, where their role was to help bring order and discipline to units that often lacked both.

Time was short. Cornwallis was advancing, and a major confrontation was approaching. Johnston worked to train the militia as best he could, instilling in them the habits and expectations of seasoned soldiers. The results became clear at the Battle of Guilford Court House on March 15, 1781.

Greene arranged his army in three lines. The North Carolina militia formed the first, the Virginia militia the second, and Continental regulars the third. When the British advanced, the North Carolina militia broke quickly, some retreating without firing. The Virginia militia, however, held their ground. They fought with determination and inflicted significant casualties on the advancing British.

Although Greene eventually ordered a withdrawal, the battle came at a high cost for Cornwallis. His army suffered heavy losses, weakening his campaign in the South. Later observers noted the steadiness of the Virginia militia, and some accounts credited Johnston and his fellow veterans with helping prepare them for that moment.

After the battle, Johnston returned home at last, reuniting briefly with his family after years away. But the war was not yet finished, and his rest did not last long. Within days, he learned that Lafayette was now operating in Virginia and facing British forces under William Phillips and Benedict Arnold. Once again, Johnston chose to return to service.

Continue reading ““In the Ranks of the Revolution: James Johnston’s War” Part II”

“In the Ranks of the Revolution: James Johnston’s War”

Emerging Revolutionary War welcomes guest historians Lori Amos Doss & Jarred A. Marlowe, bios follow part one.

Part 1: From Charlotte County to Washington’s Guard

James Johnston was born in Charlotte County, Virginia, around 1756, though no exact record of his birth has survived. Like many Revolutionary War soldiers, much of his early life remains in shadow. Even the identities of his parents are uncertain, despite Johnston referring to them in later accounts. What we do know begins in November 1776, when he made the decision to leave home and enlist in the Continental Army for a three-year term.

He joined the 14th Virginia Regiment under Colonel Charles Lewis and soon marched north to join George Washington’s army at Morristown, New Jersey. At that stage of the war, the Continental Army was still finding its footing. Enlistments were short, supplies were inconsistent, and discipline varied widely from unit to unit. Yet within a matter of months, Johnston distinguished himself.

On May 1, 1777, he was selected for the Commander in Chief’s Guard, an elite corps formed to protect Washington personally, as well as the army’s funds and official documents. This was one of the most trusted assignments in the army. Officers were instructed to select men known for their honesty, sobriety, and reliability. Washington also had a preference for appearance, requesting soldiers who were well built, neat, and presentable. Johnston’s selection tells us a great deal about how he was viewed by those who knew him. He was not simply capable. He was dependable.

Continue reading ““In the Ranks of the Revolution: James Johnston’s War””

“Brave, Meritorious, Unrewarded Kirkwood”: Unrecognized Valor in the Continental Army

Emerging Revolutionary War welcomes back guest historian Ben Powers

If the Medal of Honor had existed during the American Revolution, which American soldiers might have received it? This is the kind of counterfactual question some of my history professors might eschew, but exactly the kind of thing I’ll debate endlessly with my pals over a burger after a day roaming a battlefield. As today is Medal of Honor Day, it’s appropriate that I share why I believe that, had the Medal of Honor existed at the time of the Revolution, there is no finer candidate for the honor than Delaware’s Robert Kirkwood.

Introduction

     I recently found myself on a Zoom call with two colleagues, discussing various aspects of the American Revolution, and the conversation turned to a trip one of them planned to take to Delaware to do some research. I immediately responded with “The Blue Hens!”, thinking of the First Delaware Regiment, and followed up by asking if he had heard of Kirkwood. My friend said he had not, thus launching me into a rundown of Captain Kirkwood’s impressive combat record. I concluded with my assessment that Kirkwood was the Continental Army’s answer to World War Two Medal of Honor recipient Audie Murphy.

     The Kirkwood/Murphy comparison is the kind of shorthand line that comes up in casual conversations about the War for Independence, a hyperbolic way of saying that a man was an excellent combat leader. But even after our call ended, the comparison stayed with me. Kirkwood had been in the fight from nearly the beginning, starting with the battles around New York City in 1776, and he had fought through to Eutaw Springs, SC, in 1781. Murphy likewise had seen hard campaigning from North Africa to Germany. Murphy had earned nine battle stars on his campaign ribbon. Had a similar honor been available to Kirkwood, he would have received six campaign stars, as the US Army classifies Revolutionary War campaigns, and he deserved at least three more. The more I thought about it, the more convinced I became that Kirkwood deserved a Medal of Honor.

The Medal of Honor

     The Medal of Honor is the United States’ highest award for valor, reserved for acts of conspicuous gallantry in armed conflict performed at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty. In other words, if a recipient had not performed the act, their conduct would not have been considered dereliction of duty. The decoration has been awarded fewer than 3,600 times since its inception in 1861, during the American Civil War. Conservatively, 41 million people have served in the United States military since the American Revolution, making Medal of Honor recipients 0.01% of all American veterans. To say the Medal of Honor is awarded sparingly is an understatement. Approval for the award of the medal requires extensive corroboration from witnesses and multiple levels of review to meet a standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Audie Murphy received his Medal of Honor for single-handedly holding off an enemy infantry company in an action near Holtzwihr, France, in 1945. Did Kirkwood meet a similar standard of bravery during the American Revolution?

Historiography

     The most distinctive element of Kirkwood’s service is the fact that he was in it for the duration. Name a major engagement, and there is a good chance he was there. Long Island and White Plains in 1776? He’s there. The Philadelphia Campaign in ’77? Check. Likewise with Monmouth in ’78. When the Delaware Continentals moved to the southern theater in 1780, Kirkwood marched with them. From Camden to Eutaw Springs, he is in every major fight in South Carolina from 1780 to 1781. For all that service, Kirkwood was not a self-promoter. He participated in decisive fighting under Daniel Morgan at Cowpens on January 17, 1781, fighting with the Continentals against Banestre Tarleton. His journal entry recording the day’s events simply reads, “Defeated Tarleton”. Descriptions of Kirkwood’s combat exploits are sparse. So, how to go about determining his eligibility for the nation’s highest valor award?

Continue reading ““Brave, Meritorious, Unrewarded Kirkwood”: Unrecognized Valor in the Continental Army”

The Breaking of Maryland’s “Old Line”

Emerging Revolutionary War welcomes guest historian Drew Palmer. A biography follows at the end of this post.

What does it look like when veteran soldiers do not want to fight anymore? When morale plummets and the realities of war take their toll on men. This is exactly what happened to 150 men in the Maryland Line of the Continental Army in the late summer of 1780.

The 1st Maryland Regiment holds the line at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, March 15, 1781

The continental regiments of Maryland that made up what became known as the “Maryland Line” or “Old Line State” had earned the reputation as a reliable, brave, and disciplined fighting force as early as 1776 after their actions in the Battle of Long Island.1 At the Battle of Camden on August 16, 1780, the 1st and 2nd Maryland Brigades offered a stout defense as  Gen. Charles Cornwallis’s British force crashed into Continental soldiers from Maryland and Delaware. In the end, though, Maj. General Horatio Gates’s Southern Continental Army was completely routed from the field, with many of the Maryland Continental troops taken prisoner and held in the small village of Camden after the battle.2

The village of Camden, South Carolina, was an unpleasant place to be after the battle. The crowded conditions and brutal summer climate of South Carolina began to produce sickness amongst Cornwallis’s men and the American prisoners that were held in Camden. To prevent further sickness from spreading, Cornwallis decided to split the American prisoners held at Camden into divisions of around 150 men. These divisions were guarded by small detachments of the British army and marched from Camden to Charlestown, South Carolina.3  One detachment of the British 63rd Regiment of Foot escorted 150 prisoners of the 1st Maryland Brigade captured at Camden. The division made it to Thomas Sumter’s abandoned plantation at Great Savannah, about 60 miles northwest of Charleston. As the Maryland prisoners and their British guards halted for the night, militia commander Francis Marion received word from a Loyalist deserter that the Marylanders were nearby and decided to ambush the British element in hopes of freeing the Maryland prisoners.4 In the early morning hours of August 25, 1780, Marion’s militia attacked.

Continue reading “The Breaking of Maryland’s “Old Line””

Morristown’s Individual Furlough Stories – Who Didn’t Go on Furlough?

Part VI – Artillery & Adjutant General

Emerging Revolutionary War welcomes back guest historian and park ranger Eric Olsen. Ranger Olsen works for the National Park Service at Morristown National Historical Park. Click here to learn more about the park.

     What do poor health, a dead mother, a need to shop for new clothes, a pregnant wife, army business, a wife’s mental illness, family financial problems, and a desire to see family and old friends all have in common?

      They are all reasons officers gave for asking for furloughs during the winter encampment of 1779-1780.

     While the regulations and the various orders issued give us a general idea of the problems related to furloughs, we can get a different viewpoint by looking closer at the different Divisions, Brigades, and individuals who made up the army. The individual soldiers’ correspondence can also give us a more personal take on the furlough story. This paper will be far from comprehensive. It will just cover the furloughs that turn up in the surviving documentation. To make it easier to follow I have grouped the numbers and correspondence regarding furloughs by divisions and brigades.

Continue reading “Morristown’s Individual Furlough Stories – Who Didn’t Go on Furlough?”

Morristown’s Individual Furlough Stories – Artillery Brigade & Adjutant General

Part V – Maryland Line

Emerging Revolutionary War welcomes back guest historian and park ranger Eric Olsen. Ranger Olsen works for the National Park Service at Morristown National Historical Park. Click here to learn more about the park.

     What do poor health, a dead mother, a need to shop for new clothes, a pregnant wife, army business, a wife’s mental illness, family financial problems, and a desire to see family and old friends all have in common?

      They are all reasons officers gave for asking for furloughs during the winter encampment of 1779-1780.

     While the regulations and the various orders issued give us a general idea of the problems related to furloughs, we can get a different viewpoint by looking closer at the different Divisions, Brigades, and individuals who made up the army. The individual soldiers’ correspondence can also give us a more personal take on the furlough story. This paper will be far from comprehensive. It will just cover the furloughs that turn up in the surviving documentation. To make it easier to follow I have grouped the numbers and correspondence regarding furloughs by divisions and brigades.

Continue reading “Morristown’s Individual Furlough Stories – Artillery Brigade & Adjutant General”

Morristown’s Individual Furlough Stories – Maryland Line

Part IV – Lord Stirling’s Division

Emerging Revolutionary War welcomes back guest historian and park ranger Eric Olsen. Ranger Olsen works for the National Park Service at Morristown National Historical Park. Click here to learn more about the park.

     What do poor health, a dead mother, a need to shop for new clothes, a pregnant wife, army business, a wife’s mental illness, family financial problems, and a desire to see family and old friends all have in common?

      They are all reasons officers gave for asking for furloughs during the winter encampment of 1779-1780.

     While the regulations and the various orders issued give us a general idea of the problems related to furloughs, we can get a different viewpoint by looking closer at the different Divisions, Brigades, and individuals who made up the army. The individual soldiers’ correspondence can also give us a more personal take on the furlough story. This paper will be far from comprehensive. It will just cover the furloughs that turn up in the surviving documentation. To make it easier to follow I have grouped the numbers and correspondence regarding furloughs by divisions and brigades.

Continue reading “Morristown’s Individual Furlough Stories – Maryland Line”