The United States Army traces its birthday back to June 14, 1775—the date the Second Congressional Congress voted to adopt the New England army then encircling the British in Boston.
Almost a year later to the day—June 12, 1776—the Congress voted to establish the Board of war and Ordnance, the precursor to today’s Department of Defense.[1] One could therefore make the argument that June 12, 2026, is the 250th birthday of the department. At the very least, one could directly trace the department’s ancestry back that far.
Congress voted to establish the board in response to pressure from Gen. George Washington, who desperately needed help managing the logistics of feeding, clothing, arming, equipping, and otherwise supplying the army. He spent at least as much time begging (in a dignified but humble way) various colonies for support as he did planning and executing military strategy and tactics. Supply worries were never far from his mind. “The reflection upon my Situation, & that of this Army, produces many an uneasy hour when all around me are wrapped in Sleep . . .” he wrote a confidant.[2]
But because everything about the Continental government was voluntary, that meant colonies—soon to be states—did not have to comply with Washington’s requests, let alone any Congressional resolutions. Colonies chronically undershot troop quotas and financial contributions.
Naivety ran high in those heady, early days of the war. Colonies believed militia, rather than a trained professional army, could somehow win the war. Their “patriotic spirit” would be enough to overcome the discipline and experience of the British army and its hired mercenaries. Even members of Congress, tied more regularly to military affairs through Washington’s correspondence, bought into the idea.
“You think the present army assisted by the militia is sufficient to oppose the force of Great Britain, formidable as it appears on paper,” one of Washington’s key confidents, Gen. Nathaniel Greene, told Congress in early June. He assured them they were “greatly deceived.”[3]
The creation of the Board of War did much to make the scales fall from Congressional eyes. It did so by bringing key members of Congress more directly into the management of the war.
Nothing marked Friday, June 7, 1776, as an unusual day in Philadelphia. Residents of the city would not have taken much notice of Richard Henry Lee walking the three blocks from his temporary quarters in the home of Dr. William Shippen to the Pennsylvania State House, as he had done for several weeks prior as a member of Virginia’s delegation in the Second Continental Congress.
There was little in Lee’s manners or features that stood out, save his tall and lanky frame and the vanishing hair of a 44-year-old man in 18th-century America. Passers by might have noted the black silk glove covering Lee’s mangled, one-finger left hand, the stark reminder of a hunting accident he suffered years ago.
Richard Henry Lee, 1794.
One document in a stack of papers Lee carried looked like any other about the mundane business of the Congress trying to come to grips with fielding an army against Great Britain while also remaining loosely tied to the mother country. It was a document to sever that tie and declare Britain’s American colonies “free and independent states.”
As the Second Continental Congress in Philadelphia debated on next steps and the ultimate goal of the war with Great Britain, leaders in Virginia decided to push the needle. Virginia was the largest (population and economically wise) colony in the 13 rebellious colonies. Many of its leaders were seen as leaders in the Continental Congress and in revolutionary thought. Other colonial leaders, including John Adams, knew that for the war and independence to be successful, Virginia needed to be a leading participant in the effort.
The Fifth Virginia Convention, the extra-legal body running Virginia in the absence of Royal authority, met in the Virginia Capitol in Williamsburg on May 6, 1776. There was a lot to discuss among the members. The Convention consisted of more conservative planters from the eastern part of the colony. These members tended to favor reconciliation with the mother country. Other members of the convention, that supported a more radical response were from the western part of the colony (west of the fall line) and many of its legal and philosophical minds (George Mason, James Madison, George Wythe). These men, who held the majority of the Convention, favored independence and also held the hearts and minds of most Virginians.
The most significant action of the Fifth Convention came on May 15, 1776, adopting groundbreaking resolutions. First the Convention directed Virginia’s delegates to the Continental Congress to propose a formal declaration of independence, to “declare the United Colonies free and independent states…” This directive was the first official call from any colony for a complete break with Britain. It signaled that reconciliation was no longer the goal; independence had become both necessary and inevitable in the minds of Virginia’s revolutionary leaders.
The resolution went even further. It not only urged independence but also called for the establishment of foreign alliances and confederation among the colonies. These measures demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of what independence would require: diplomatic recognition, military support, and political unity. Virginia’s leadership recognized that separation from Britain would not be sustainable without these elements in place. Soon, on June 7, 1776 in Philadelphia, Virginian Richard Henry Lee took the direction from the Fifth Convention and proposed that the Continental Congress declare independence.
Secondly, the Convention called for constructing its own independent government, taking concrete steps to replace colonial rule with a republican system. This new constitution of the “Commonwealth of Virginia’ would set up the system for which Virginia would be governed. Finally, the convention appointed a committee to draft a declaration of rights. This effort reflected the belief that independence was not just about rejecting British authority but also about creating a new political order grounded in principles of liberty and self-government.
One of the most influential figures in this process was George Mason. Mason drafted the Virginia Declaration of Rights, a document that would become one of the most important statements of political philosophy in the revolutionary era. Adopted in June 1776, it asserted that all men are by nature equally free and possess inherent rights, including the enjoyment of life and liberty, the means of acquiring property, and the pursuit of happiness and safety. It also emphasized that government derives its power from the people and must be accountable to them.
Delegate James Madison wrote townspeople in Williamsburg took down the Union Jack and replaced it with the Continental Union flag.
Another key figure connected to Virginia’s revolutionary leadership was Thomas Jefferson, who was serving in the Continental Congress. Although he was not present at the Virginia Convention in May, the instructions sent by Virginia directly influenced his work. When Congress appointed a committee to draft a declaration of independence, Jefferson drew heavily on ideas similar to those expressed in Mason’s document. The resulting United States Declaration of Independence, adopted in July, echoed Virginia’s emphasis on natural rights and the legitimacy of revolution against unjust government. The Convention also created a committee to design a state seal, this committee (led by George Wythe) adopted the seal of Virginia that is the basis for the seal used today.
Virginia’s actions in May 1776 also reflected broader social and political changes within the colony. The authority of the royal governor, Lord Dunmore, had effectively collapsed, and revolutionary institutions had taken control. Local committees and militias enforced the decisions of the convention, demonstrating that power had shifted from imperial officials to colonial leaders. This transition was not without conflict, but by May 1776, the revolutionary cause had gained widespread support among Virginia’s population. In the mind of Virginians, as of May 1776, Virginia was independent of the King and Parliament of Great Britain.
On June 12th, a follow up article will commemorate the 250th anniversary of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.
The American Revolution lasted eight years, 1775-1783. Why then do we celebrate 1776 and not the end of the war? Continental Congress presented the Declaration of Independence to the world on July 4, 1776. That’s the big deal.
There was something different about this revolution against British authority. The colonies were better organized. The people, policymakers, and military worked in harmony, though imperfect, toward freeing themselves from the bonds of the British Empire. Lexington and Concord had loudly proclaimed the shots heard round the world in April 1775.
By the second year, the colonial armies already had two significant military achievements in the winter and early spring. The militia turned back the invading southern British army at the battle of Moore’s Creek Bridge, North Carolina, in February. This victory contained the Redcoats in the southern theater to South Carolina. Up north, the British army withdrew from Boston in March, giving the colonists a physical and moral achievement. The leaders of the Glorious Cause, however, knew violence and blood wouldn’t be enough to win the war as failed Scottish and Irish uprisings had demonstrated all too well.
It was now up to the Continental Congress to fire a political shot. Congress tasked a committee of five to draft a declaration in June 1776. The members included Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston. Jefferson was the principal author. By July 1776, a final version was signed and submitted. It was only two paragraphs, but its words were, and still are, heard round the world.
The Declaration of Independence succinctly describes two of the five “Ws” of the war. Why we were fighting, or the main political goal, was first to be put forth. The colonists demanded a political divorce from British rule. As the committee wrote, at times “…it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another …” Instead, the colonies wanted to form their own government based on a constitutional republic. It would be equal in standing to all other sovereign nations. That was the Why.
Then our founding fathers pulled the trigger and laid out the What, the reasons or “unalienable rights” we were fighting for against the crown. “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” The King and Parliament hadn’t given these rights to any of their colonies or even their own citizens.
In fact, quite the reverse, British rule had subjugated the American colonies in “a long train of abuses and usurpations.” Redcoats threw colonists in jail without due process. Colonists were hung without a trial or after an unfair trial. Parliament levied taxes on colonial goods at a whim. We were subjects. We were here to serve the crown. Facing such despotism, the colonies had every right to abolish political ties with the British Empire and pursue life, liberty, and happiness.
It’s these three rights that we will soon be celebrating by commemorating the 250th Anniversary of the document that declared those rights, the Declaration of Independence.
Join us this Sunday at 7pm LIVE on our Facebook page as we focus on ERW’s first 2026 book release, The Atlas of Independence: John Adams and the American Revolution by Dr. Chris Mackowski. Mackowski will discuss why Adams led him to write his first “Rev War book” and the much over looked impact Adams had during the war years. We will discuss some of the more “unique” relationships Adams developed through the war time years and of course his friendship with Thomas Jefferson and his close relationship with his wife Abigail.
To order a copy of “Atlas of Independence” visit Savas Beatie’s website at: https://www.savasbeatie.com/ . Again, this will be a LIVE broadcast on our Facebook page, so grab a drink and join in on the chat!
The Commission of Captain Samuel Nicholas, the first American Marine. (USMC)
Today marks the 250th birthday of the Marine Corps. November 10, 1775 was a milestone in the creation of American naval power, but the birthday story is a little more complicated.
The Continental Congress resolved to create a navy under its auspices on October 13, 1775, but much work remained to build American naval power to a point where it might serve a strategic purpose. Individual colonies had already begun creating naval forces and George Washington had leased ships under the army’s authority. Thus, the resolution served as more of milestone on a long road, rather than a fresh beginning.
On October 30, the Continental Congress considered the reports of its naval committee and confirmed recommendations for two vessels of 14 and 10 guns. Moreover, it resolved to add two more ships to its burgeoning navy, one of 20 guns and one carrying up to 36 guns. It also added four new members to the naval committee, bringing it to a total of seven. Stephen Hopkins (RI), Joseph Hewes (NC), Richard Henry Lee (VA), and John Adams (MA) joined John Langdon (NH), Silas Deane (CT), and Christopher Gadsden (SC).[1] On November 2, Congress gave the naval committee authority to call on the treasury for up to $100,000 to acquire a navy and delegated to the committee the authority to recruit officers and seamen, offering them prize money in the amount of one-half the value of all warships and one-third the value of transports made prizes.[2] It also took up a petition from a Committee of Safety in Passamaquoddy, Nova Scotia to join the association represented by the Continental Congress. Naturally, Congress appointed a committee—Silas Deane, John Jay, Stephen Hopkins, John Langdon, and John Adams to consider the matter. The naval expansion and Passamaquoddy petition sparked a new round of thinking about American naval power.
Unity vs. Margaretta, 12 June 1775 by Robert Lambdin (Naval History and Heritage Command). Margaretta was a Royal Navy vessel captured off Machias, then part of Massachusetts but now in Maine. The image illustrates the relatively small sizes of vessels involved in creating the early American navy.
During the first six months of the American rebellion, the colonies inched toward some means of dealing with Britain’s naval superiority. Over the summer the Americans had already waged a sort of whaleboat war among the estuaries and islands around Boston, mainly to deprive the British army couped up there of forage and fodder. Efforts escalated as the war continued. A confrontation between small Royal Navy vessels and the Massachusetts town of Machias over the summer serendipitously resulted in a small Massachusetts Navy created by capture in June 1775.[1] In June, Rhode Island’s General Assembly voted to charter two ships and outfit them for naval operations to protect the colony’s trade, essentially by contesting the Royal Navy’s control of Narragansett Bay.[2] In September, Colonel John Glover in the Continental Army offered his fishing schooner, Hannah, as a charter to wage war on the sea. George Washington naturally accepted, limiting its operations to capturing unarmed supply ships serving the British army.[3] The army had essentially created its own navy out of necessity.
On August 2, 1775, the Second Continental Congress wrapped up its summer session 250 years ago. Philadelphia’s heatwave that summer—described as “Very Close & Hot”—was too much for the delegates. “We have sat much longer than expected,” one Congressman grumbled. “We are all exhausted.”
The Congress had been working tirelessly since its session began on May 10, 1775. In just 12 weeks, the body accomplished an impressive list of tasks, many of which escalated the growing tension with Great Britain:
Declared a state of military readiness across the colonies
Appealed to Canadians for support in the Revolution
Raised companies of riflemen in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to reinforce the Boston Army
Elected George Washington as Commander-in-Chief
Appointed four major generals and eight brigadier generals
Adopted the Olive Branch Petition in a final effort for peace
Released the “Declaration of the Causes and Necessities of Taking Up Arms”
Rejected Lord North’s Plan for Reconciliation
Established a postal department
Appointed commissioners to negotiate peace with Indian tribes
Rather than resting from the sessions of the last 12 weeks, many members of the Second Continental Congress continued to work tirelessly to support the colonies’ efforts against Great Britain. Many returned home to ensure these measures were implemented at the local level. But there was still uncertainty about how King George III would respond to the Olive Branch Petition. Would the King accept the offer of peace? Only time would tell.
Pennsylvania State House, ca. 1770. Courtesy of the National Park Service
On May 10, 1775, the delegates convened their Second Continental Congress in Philadelphia. Unlike the First Continental Congress held a year before, this Congress had more delegates and met in the Pennsylvania State House and not Carpenters Hall. Also, events spiraled out of control since 1774, and the northern colonies were in outright rebellion with the battles of Lexington and Concord and the capture of Fort Ticonderoga. The delegates dived into several heavy topics as now blood was shed and an army of several thousand besieged the British in Boston.
Just before the Congress met John Adams wrote “our prospect of a Union of the Colonies, is promising indeed. Never was there such a Sprit.” It is evident that there were many discussions in the taverns around Philadelphia among the delegates that showed the feelings of many had changed since 1774. Though there were still a large portion of the colonies that were not ready to give up reconciliation with Great Britain. This tug in pull between men like John Adams and men like John Dickenson (more on the side of reconciliation) is shown in two documents passed by the Congress in early July. The “Olive Branch Petition” and the “Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms” reflect the mixed views of the Congress and the colonies as a whole of —conciliation and confrontation. Together, they illustrate the ideological crossroads at which the colonies stood, torn between loyalty to the British Crown and the growing necessity of armed resistance.
The “Olive Branch Petition”, drafted primarily by John Dickinson of Pennsylvania and approved by the Continental Congress on July 5, 1775, was a final attempt by the colonies to avoid a full-scale war with Great Britain. Despite the ongoing military engagements at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, many colonial leaders still hoped for a peaceful resolution to the growing conflict. The petition expressed loyalty to King George III and implored him to intervene in the escalating tensions caused by his ministers and Parliament.
John Dickinson was the leader of the moderates of the Second Continental Congress. Dickinson has the distinction of serving in the Congress as a representative from Pennsylvania and then Deleware. Courtesy of the National Park Service.
The document was rooted in the belief that reconciliation was still possible. It portrayed the colonies as loyal subjects who had been forced into resistance by the oppressive acts of the British government. The petition requested the King to repeal the Coercive Acts and halt hostilities, suggesting that harmony could be restored without further bloodshed.
Key to understanding the “Olive Branch Petition” is the deep-seated colonial belief in the distinction between the King and Parliament. Many colonists viewed Parliament as the source of tyranny but retained faith in the monarch as a potential protector. This petition, therefore, was not revolutionary but reformist. It sought to open a dialogue rather than sever ties.
However, the petition was rejected outright by King George III, who had already declared the colonies in open rebellion in August 1775 (before the Olve Branch petition arrived in London). He refused to read the document and issued the Proclamation of Rebellion, affirming Britain’s intent to suppress the colonial uprising by force. Many believed that the blood shed at Bunker Hill (226 killed and 828 wounded) combined with the fighting on April 19th backed the King into a corner. How could he accept peace when British soldiers were killed by rebels, especially since by the time he received the petition all the colonies were under arms against him. The rejection marked a turning point: it signaled the end of any realistic hopes for a peaceful compromise and pushed more colonists toward the idea of independence.
In stark contrast, the “Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms”, approved on July 6, 1775, just one day after the “Olive Branch Petition”, presented a much more assertive stance. Drafted by a committee including Thomas Jefferson and John Dickinson, the document aimed to justify the colonies’ decision to resist British authority through armed force.
The Declaration opened with a powerful assertion of the colonists’ natural rights and their entitlement to resist tyranny. It traced the history of British oppression, citing the Intolerable Acts, the imposition of taxes without consent, the quartering of troops, and the use of military force to suppress civil liberties. Unlike the Olive Branch Petition, which appealed to the King’s mercy, this document framed the conflict as a necessary defense of liberty and justice.
Although it still professed allegiance to the Crown, the Declaration was far more militant in tone. It acknowledged the seriousness of taking up arms but asserted that the colonies had been left with no other choice. It stated:
“Our cause is just. Our union is perfect. Our internal resources are great, and, if necessary, foreign assistance is undoubtedly attainable.”
This language revealed a shift in colonial thinking—from grievances to justification, from negotiation to resistance. The document was an attempt to rally public support and unify the colonies behind a common cause, portraying the struggle not as a rebellion but as a righteous defense against despotism.
Courtesy of Special Collections, University of Delaware Library
The coexistence of these two documents reflects the political complexity and emotional turmoil of the time. The Continental Congress, representing a wide spectrum of colonial opinion, tried to navigate between diplomacy and defiance. The “Olive Branch Petition” sought to appeal to moderates and loyalists who feared war, while the Declaration of the Causes aimed to galvanize patriots and articulate a coherent justification for resistance.
This dual approach was not merely political hedging but a reflection of genuine uncertainty. Many colonists still considered themselves British and hoped to remain within the empire, albeit under reformed governance. At the same time, the continued military aggression from Britain made armed resistance increasingly inevitable.
Ultimately, the failure of the “Olive Branch Petition” and the intensification of British military efforts helped consolidate revolutionary sentiment. The rejection by King George III confirmed to many that reconciliation was no longer possible. Over the following months, radical voices like Thomas Paine’s in Common Sense would build upon the groundwork laid by the “Declaration of the Causes” and push for full independence, culminating in the Declaration of Independence in July 1776.
The “Olive Branch Petition” and the “Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms” encapsulate the American colonies’ transition from loyal subjects to revolutionaries. They demonstrate how, in the face of unyielding imperial power, a people once desperate to avoid conflict found themselves compelled to fight. These documents not only reflect the diplomatic and ideological struggles of the Revolutionary era but also serve as enduring symbols of the tension between peace and justice in times of crisis.
“[T]he Battle of Lexington on the 19th of April, changed the Instruments of Warfare from the Penn to the Sword,” John Adams wrote years after the event. He was well acquainted with the pen as an instrument of warfare. By the spring of 1775, he was twelve letters into a thirteen-letter volley that would become known as the “Novanglus letters”—a series that appeared in the Boston Gazette starting January 23.[1]
The final of those letters appeared, by happenstance, on April 19—the same day as the battles of Lexington and Concord. The thirteenth letter of the series never appeared because of the suspension of printing in Massachusetts following the battle.[2]
Adams was, at the time of the battle, preparing to return to Philadelphia for the next session of the Continental Congress. Before his departure, however, he resolved to ride out to the battlefield so he could see with his own eyes the results of the bloodshed that had occurred. He felt it would make him a more reliable witness when he reported on the event to Congress.
On April 22, Adams rode by horseback from his home in Quincy to Cambridge, where the local militia had concentrated. There, Adams met with military leaders, generals Artemis Ward, William Heath, and Joseph Warren. He also informally inspected the troops, “the New England Army,” as he characterized them.[3]
“There was great Confusion and much distress,” Adams recounted: “Artillery, Arms, Cloathing were wanting and a sufficient Supply of Provisions not easily obtained. Neither the officers nor Men however wanted Spirits or Resolution.”
But how long would such spirit and resolve last, Adams wondered? This questions would inform his strategy when he eventually arrived in Philadelphia.
From Cambridge, Adams rode west toward “Lexington and along the Scene of Action for many miles. . . .” Rubble from the battle still laid strewn along the road from Concord to Lexington and from Lexington back into Boston—a route Adams traced in reverse. He did not write down details of what he saw, but they made a deep impression, as would soon become evident in his attitudes about independence.
To help make sense of what he saw, he “enquired of the Inhabitants” about “the Circumstances” of the battle. “These were not calculated to diminish my Ardour in the Cause,” he admitted. “They on the Contrary convinced me that the Die was cast, the Rubicon passed, and as Lord Mansfield expressed it in Parliament, if We did not defend ourselves they would kill Us.”
Just after his visit to the battlefield, illness debilitated Adams, which delayed his departure for Congress. He did manage to catch up to his fellow delegates en route. Along the way, they saw first-hand how the events at Lexingon and Concord had galvanized public opinion, although it would yet be some months before Congress itself followed public opinion.
But for Adams, events had indeed crossed the Rubicon. He began his unceasing, inexorable push toward independence.
Yet it was a two-pronged approach for Adams, who not only operated on that larger existential level but also on a more immediate, pragmatic one. After all, the sword, not the pen, was now the main weapon. He began advocating for measures that would transform “the New England Army” into a Continental one. His nomination of George Washington to lead the fledgling force, for example, was a masterful stroke to diversify the army and, thus, ensure more colonies had skin in the game.
Congress’s slow pace toward independence would frustrate Adams almost to no end over the fifteen months that would follow. However, the bloodshed of Lexington and Concord made an impression on Adams that would drive him onward, inexorably, toward July 1776 and beyond.
[3] Quote from Adams come from John Adams autobiography, part 1, “John Adams,” through 1776, sheet 18 of 53 [electronic edition]. Adams Family Papers: An Electronic Archive. Massachusetts Historical Society. http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/
Emerging Revolutionary War Era 